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Abstract 
 
This study aims to determine the influence of various firm level characteristics such as, 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield, volatility 
and liquidity on capital structure. Employing the cross-sectional data methodology, the 
researcher examines the capital structure determinants of 202 companies from FTSE 250 
for the time period of 2002 – 2009. Seven variables multiple regression models are used 
to estimate the influence of firm level attributes on capital structure and capital structure 
is measured simultaneously by the ratios of total debt, long-term debt and short-term 
debt at both book value and market value of equity. The results obtained from four 
different regression models show that profitability and liquidity are negatively and 
significantly related to leverage. Also asset tangibility has a positive relationship with 
leverage, which is significant. Moreover the researcher finds that total debt ratio at 
market value of equity is the most important dependent variable as a proxy of capital 
structure, followed by long-term debt ratio at market value of equity.  
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1. Introduction 
Capital structure has been one of the most broadly argued subjects in corporate finance. 
Since the study of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the question has been raised that how 
the mixture of debt and equity in capital structure affects the firm value. Also the factors 
that can have impacts on firm‟s capital structure are very argumentative subject in the 
finance literature. 
So far there have been many studies conducted on determinants of capital structure and 
these papers try to investigate the significant correlations between capital structure and 
possible firm specific characteristic having impact on it. These studies have been started 
with the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and researchers still carry on 
identifying the determinants of capital structure with latest and different methods. In this 
paper, researcher analyses capital structure and its determinants for 202 listed UK 
companies over the time period from 2002 to 2009. The aim of this paper is to 
investigate whether there is a significant correlation between the capital structure and 
firm-level characteristics such as profitability, size, growth opportunities, asset 
tangibility (asset structure), non-debt tax shield, volatility (risk), liquidity and time 
dummies to extend the past studies which have been conducted in 2000s.  
The focus of this research is to answer following question; 
Is there a significant correlation between the capital structure and firm-level 
characteristics (profitability, size, growth, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, volatility and 
liquidity) of capital structure in listed UK companies?   
The data, which was collected from secondary sources, are subject to analysis based on 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model. OLS method has been used in study of 
Ozkan (2001) and Bennett and Donnelly (2003) which examined the relationship 
between leverage and dependent variables, such as profitability, size, growth, tangibility, 
non-debt tax shield, volatility and liquidity.  
In the literature review, Section 2, the background of fundamental theories of capital 
structure and the past studies done on the relevant subject is provided. Section 3 presents 
the aim and objectives, research methodology and explains the data sample and data 
collection and describes dependent and independent variables as named above. Section 4 
presents the preliminary analysis of data sample, descriptive statistics and results 
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obtained from regression models (Model A, Model B, Model C and Model D). Section 5 
includes eight subsections for each independent variable. In these sections, results from 
different regression models are incorporated with past empirical studies‟ results and 
capital structure theories. In conclusion, section 6, consists of the summary this paper, 
findings, limitation of study and recommendation for further study.  
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2. Literature Review 
Capital structure can be defined as the mixture of firm‟s capital with debt and equity and 
it has been one of the most argumentative subjects in corporate finance, since the 
outstanding study of Modigliani and Miller in 1958 (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Many 
theories have been developed in the literature for examining determinants of capital 
structure and they focus on which determinants are more likely to have a major role on 
the leverage decisions. However, it is still debated what the determinants of capital 
structure are and how they impact capital structure decisions, even though there have 
been various studies conducted on the relevant subject.  In this paper, the researcher 
intends to review fundamental capital structure theories briefly and give past empirical 
studies on determinants of capital structure.  
2.1 Financial Distress and Trade-off Theory 
Financial distress has an important position in capital structure theories. Berk and 
DeMarzo (2007, p. 509) define financial cost as „when a firm has trouble meeting its 
debt obligations we say the firm is in financial distress‟. When a firm increases its 
proportion of debt to equity for financing its operations and future investments, the 
probability of default on the debt will raise as well (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). The 
cost arising from financial distress plays crucial role on the firm‟s future decisions such 
as, investment policy, cuts in research and development activities, advertisement and 
educational expenditures (Warner, 1977). All these decisions as an outcome of financial 
distress will affect firm‟s value negatively and lead to decline in the firm‟s value; 
therefore the wealth of shareholders will decrease as well (Arnold, 2008).  
There are two types of costs arising from financial distress, direct and indirect cost. 
Direct costs are bankruptcy fee, administrative fee and legal costs as well (Warner, 
1977). Indirect costs arise from firm‟s decision-makings due to financial distress. These 
are, as mentioned above, changes in investment policy such as, postponing future 
positive NPV investments or totally discarding investment opportunity, decrease in staff 
educational expenditures and reducing research and development and marketing 
activities (Arnold, 2008). 
The trade-off theory states that interest tax shield and cost of bankruptcy (financial 
distress) plays crucial role on firm‟s leveraged ratio. This theory suggest that the total 
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value of a geared firm equals the value of the ungeared firm plus present value of the 
interest tax shield, minus the present value of financial cost (Berk and DeMarzo, 2007). 
Therefore the firm looks for optimum debt ratio, which offsets tax savings benefits 
opposing to the cost of possible bankruptcy and agency conflict (Gajurel, 2005). 
According to the trade-off theory, companies that make high profits are more likely to 
have higher leverage and more taxable income to shield (Barclay and Smith, 2005). 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) study shows that this theory fails in some cases to 
illuminate why profitable firms have low debt ratio. Also Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
suggest that the trade-off theory has some shortcomings and limitations. In addition to 
these empirical studies of Kester (1986) and Titman and Wessels (1988), which supports 
that, there is strong inverse correlation between profitability and debt ratios in capital 
structure. As a result, due to shortcomings and flaws of trade-off theory, the theory is not 
adequate when determining the ideal capital structure.    
2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed the pecking order theory that firms would prefer 
retained earnings as a primary source of internal financing.  If internal financing does 
not meet the requirements, then firms prefer external financing by issuing securities.  
According to Myers (1984), if the firm is need of using external finance, firm chooses 
first the safest security (debt market) to issue rather than convertible bonds. As a last 
choice, the firm recourses equity market and issue external equity.  
The firm that has not enough available internal finance would either use equity or debt 
issue to finance future positive NPV investments.  According to Myers and Majluf 
(1984), issuing external equity gives a bad signal to the market that supporting equity is 
overrated. Nevertheless issuing debt sends a signal supporting stock is underestimated. 
This conflict „leads to an interaction between investment and financing decision‟ 
(Gajurel, 2005, p. 19).  
The pecking order theory suggests that there is no exact target level of leverage and 
interest tax shield and financial distress are considered as less effective factors when 
determining capital structure decisions (Myers, 2001). Also he further advocates that 
trade-off theory does not differentiate finance equities as external and internal and states 
that there is a positive correlation between profitability and debt ratio. Nevertheless, 
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pecking order theory advocates a negatively correlated relationship and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) suggest less profitable firms are more like to borrow more debt to finance 
future positive NPV investments; therefore the firm will raise its profitability. In 
addition to this, the studies of Ozkan (2001), Kester (1986) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) support inverse relationship between leverage and profitability. As a result, 
pecking order theory is much more accurate in order to explain reverse relationship of 
profitability and debt ratios rather than trade-off theory.  
2.3 Agency Cost 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as examining conflicts and 
relationships between the agent (corporate managers) and principals (shareholders). The 
opposed interests of principals and agents and separation of management and ownership 
in a firm cause these conflicts. For instance, managers may be interested in taking 
negative NPV projects or making unnecessary acquisitions by paying too much to 
increase size and reputation of the firm instead of maximising the wealth of 
shareholders.  The explanation behind this is the agents are more likely to run and 
control bigger firms than smaller ones. Hence the managers will receive higher salaries 
and remuneration packages as a result of increasing size of the firm (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2007). In conclusion, managers may tend to operate the firm in consistent with their 
interest rather than taking into consideration of increasing the firm value and wealth of 
shareholders. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Jensen (1986) describe two types of conflicts, the agency 
cost of equity and the agency cost of debt. The agency cost of equity, as mentioned 
above, is between shareholders and managers and small firms generally do not suffer 
from this cost since they are mostly operated by owners (Easterbrook, 1984). This cost 
emerges from management board‟s different interests, which are not corresponded to 
maximising stockholder wealth. The agency cost of debt is between equity holders and 
debt holders and this conflict arises from risk shifting which means transferring risk 
from debt holders to equity holders by making risky investments with debt (Jensen, 
1986).   
Jensen (1986) also states that a firm, which has high levels of excess cash, is more likely 
to experience agency cost. When excess cash is reducing and debt is increasing, it would 
10 
 
limit the availability of money for future investments and spending. Hence managers 
tend to manage firm more attentively not to face financial distress and this decreases 
possibility of experiencing agency cost. According to Harris and Raviv (1991) study, 
leverage is used as a tool for providing motivation and discipline for management and 
minimising agency cost.  
In conclusion, Harris and Raviv (1991) further state that there is a positive relationship 
between leverage and free cash flow, company value and liquidity. 
2.4 Past Empirical Studies 
When the past empirical studies are analysed, there is still no generally accepted model 
on determinants of capital structure. Each researcher takes into consideration different 
determinants that impact the level of debt ratio. Some prominent and recent studies are 
listed on Table 1.  
. 
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Table 1: Past Empirical Studies 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
Resarch Data Period Focus 
Sample 
Size 
    Profitability (P)                                                                      
Size (S)                                                                     
Growth (G)                                                              
Tangibility (T)                                                                       
Non-debt Tax Shield 
(TS)                               
Volatility (V) 
Other Determinants
Wald (1999) 1993 
French, German, UK 
and Japanese 
Companies 
4404 P, S, G, T, TS, V 
Moral Hazard                                
Bankruptcy Cost 
Bevan and 
Danbolt (2000) 
1991-1997 
Non-financial UK 
companies 
1054 P, S, G, T   
Ozkan (2001) 1984-1996 
Non-financial UK 
Companies 
390 P, S, G, TS 
 
Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) 
2001-2002 
European 
Companies 
710 S,V 
Industry Effect                                                   
Investment Grade                                       
Level of Foreign Sales                
Credit Rating  
Chen (2003) 1995-2000 
Listed Chinese 
Companies 
88 P, S, G, T 
 
Gaud et al. (2003) 1991-2000 
Listed Swiss 
Companies 
106 P, S, G, T, V   
Sahh and Hijazi 
(2004) 
1997-2001 
Non-financial 
Pakistani Companies 
445 P, S, G, T 
 
Bauer (2004) 2000-2001 Czech Companies 74 P, S, G, T, TS   
Song (2005) 1992-2000 Swedish Companies 6000 P, S, G, T, TS 
 
Eriotis et al. 
(2007) 
1997-2001 
Listed Greek 
Companies 
129 S, G 
Quick Ratio                                      
Interest Coverage Ratio 
Chang and Lee 
(2008) 
1988-2003 Various Campanies 351 P,G,TS 
Uniqueness                                        
Collateral Value 
Dragota and 
Semenescu 
1997-2005 
Romanian  Listed 
Companies 
54 P,S,G,T   
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(2008) 
Psillaki and 
Daskalakis (2008) 
1998-2002 
SMEs from Greece, 
France, Italy and 
Portugal 
3630 P, S, G, T, V 
 
Deari and Deari 
(2009) 
2005-2007 
Listed and Unlisted 
Macedonian 
Companies 
32 P, S, G, T, TS   
Liu and Ren 
(2009) 
2004-2007 
Listed Chinese IT 
Companies 
92 P, S, G, T Liquidity 
Abor (2009) 1998-2003 Ghanaian Firms 230 P,S,G,T Dividend 
Brinkhuis and 
Maeseneire 
(2009) 
2000-2007 
European 
Companies 
126 P,S,G,TS Collateral Value of Assets 
Céspedes, 
González and 
Molina (2009) 
1996-2005 
Latin American 
Firms 
1168 P,S,G,TS Ownership Concentration 
Vasiliou and 
Daskalakis (2009) 
2002-2003 
Listed firms at the 
Athens Exchange 
89 TS 
Uniqueness                                       
Industry 
Oztekin (2009) 1991-2006 
Non-financial firms 
in the Compustat 
Global Vantage 
Database 
15177 S,T 
Liquidity                                     
Research and Development 
Ramlall (2009) 2005-2006 
Non-listed  and non-
financial firms in 
Mauritius 
450 P,S,G,T,TS 
Liquidity                                         
Age 
Ramachandran 
and Packkirisamy 
(2010) 
1996-2007 Indian Companies 73 P,S Dividend Payout 
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2.5 Firm-level Characteristics 
Past researches (Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009), Ramlall (2009) and Oztekin (2009)) on 
determinants of capital structure used some characteristics such as, profitability, size, 
growth, tangibility (asset structure), non-debt tax shield, volatility (risk), product 
uniqueness, time dummies, income variability, industry, ownership structure and 
liquidity. In this research, the most common and affecting determinants; profitability, 
size, growth, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, volatility, liquidity and time dummies are 
suggested as independent variables. 
2.5.1 Profitability 
From the past studies listed on Table 1 have found that profitability plays the most 
crucial role as a determinant of capital structure. Also past studies done by Ozkan 
(2001), Gaud et al. (2003), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) show a strong inverse relationship 
between debt ratio and profitability. The ratio of earning before interest, tax and 
depreciation (EBITDA), to total assets is assumed as measure to profitability.  
Profitability = EBITDA / Total Assets 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
H1: There is a positive relationship between profitability and leverage 
2.5.2 Size  
According to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Ozkan (2001), there is positive relationship 
between size and leverage. However Bevan and Danbolt (2000) found significant 
negative relationship between size and short-term debt ratio. Also Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) further state that the effect of size on short-term and long-term debt ratio is 
unclear and inconclusive. Hence, in this paper the relationship between size and 
leverage is investigated according to following hypotheses. 
Size = Natural Logarithm of Sales [ln (Sales)] 
Hypothesis 2A: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between size and leverage 
H1: There is a negative relationship between size and leverage 
Hypothesis 2B: 
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H0: There is a positive relationship between size and long-term leverage 
H1: There is a negative relationship between size and long-term leverage 
Hypothesis 2C: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between size and short-term leverage 
H1: There is a negative relationship between size and short-term leverage 
2.5.3 Growth Opportunity 
Growth opportunity can be defined in several ways, thus past studies have taken into 
account different measures for growth. In this paper, in the line with Rajan and Zingales 
(2005), Bevan and Danbolt (2000) and Gaud et al. (2003) market to book ratio is used as 
a proxy for growth opportunity.  
Growth Opportunity = Market to Book Ratio 
Hypothesis 3: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between growth opportunity and leverage 
H1: There is a positive relationship between growth opportunity and leverage 
2.5.4 Asset Tangibility 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that asset tangibility is positively correlated with 
debt ratio and some other researchers, Bennett and Donnelly (2003), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Gaud et al. (2003), have found evidences that support this correlation. On the 
other hand, Bevan and Danbolt (2000) and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008) stated that 
there is negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. To investigate this 
relationship in both terms of long-term and short-term, following hypotheses are tested.  
Asset Tangibility = Fixed Assets / Total Assets 
Hypothesis 4A: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage 
H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage 
Hypothesis 4B: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and long-term leverage 
H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and long-term leverage 
Hypothesis 4C: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and short-term leverage 
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H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and short-term leverage 
2.5.5 Non-debt Tax Shield 
According to past studies done by Ozkan (2001), Wald (1999) and Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993), evidences have been found that there is negative relationship between 
non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and leverage. To examine this relationship, the proportion 
of annual depreciation to total assets is used as a proxy for NDTS. 
NDTS = Annual Depreciation / Total Assets 
Hypothesis 5: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between NDTS and leverage 
H1: There is a positive relationship between NDTS and leverage 
2.5.6 Volatility 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008) have found negative relationship between volatility and 
leverage. Contrary, Bennett and Donnelly (1993) have found evidences supporting 
positive relationship between them. As Titman and Wessels (1988) stated, standard 
deviation of EBITDA is used as a proxy of volatility. This paper examines this relation 
ship with the following hypothesis. 
Volatility = Standard Deviation of EBITDA  
Hypothesis 6: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between volatility and leverage 
H1: There is a positive relationship between volatility and leverage 
2.5.7 Liquidity 
Ozkan (2001) suggests that liquidity has ambiguous effect on the capital structure 
decisions. In the line with study of Ozkan (2001), the proportion of current assets to 
current liabilities is chosen as a proxy for liquidity.  
Liquidity = Current Assets / Current Liabilities  
Hypothesis 7: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage 
H1: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and leverage 
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2.6 Hypotheses 
The summary of hypotheses, which have been proposed in the literature review as 
showed on following table. 
 
Table 2: Hypotheses 
 
                                     Hypothesis 
Profitability H1: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
  H2A: There is a positive relationship between size and leverage 
Size H2B: There is a positive relationship between size and long-term leverage 
  H2C: There is a positive relationship between size and short-term leverage 
Growth H3: There is a negative relationship between growth and leverage 
  H4A: There is positive relationship between tangibility and leverage 
Tangibility H4B: There is positive relationship between tangibility and long-term leverage 
  H4C: There is positive relationship between tangibility and short-term leverage 
Non-debt 
Tax Shield 
H5: There is a negative relationship between NDTS and leverage 
Volatility H6: There is a negative relationship between volatility and leverage 
Liquidity H7: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage 
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3. Methodology 
Past researches on determinants of capital structure mostly based on positivist approach 
and this paper will be prepared under the positivist paradigm. This paper intends to 
identify determinants of UK firms‟ capital structure by using regression analysis in 
SPSS. It also tries to examine the correlations between leverage and possible 
determinants. 
3.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether there is a significant correlation between 
the capital structure and firm-level characteristics, such as profitability, size, growth 
opportunity, asset tangibility (asset structure), non-debt tax shield, volatility (risk), 
product uniqueness, time dummies, income variability, industry, ownership structure 
and liquidity.  In this paper, profitability, size, growth opportunity, asset tangibility, 
non-debt tax shield, volatility and liquidity are suggested as independent variables. 
Thus, the dependent variable is expressed as a function of these variables, 
Leverage = f {profitability, size, growth opportunity, asset tangibility, non-debt tax 
shield, volatility and liquidity} 
Since the amount of debt differs in a period of time, leverage is figured out in different 
manners, according to short term, long term and total debt amount. This paper focuses 
on determinants of listed UK firms‟ capital structure. The sample of this empirical study 
is chosen taking into account several reasons. Private UK companies are not listed on 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and it is quite hard to access their financial statements. 
Also, accessing the financial statements of companies from outside of UK would be 
highly costly and time consuming. These reasons led to investigation of publicly listed 
UK companies. 
This empirical study is based on the cross-section data from 2002 to 2009. This time 
horizon is carefully selected to examine the up to date determinants of capital structure 
and extension of past empirical studies in 2000s.  
3.2 Data 
Past empirical studies which investigating significant relationship between leverage and 
determinants based on mostly quantitative data from financial materials. To collect data, 
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there are various ready to use sources providing primary and secondary data. Sample of 
this study is comprised of 202 listed UK companies. 
3.2.1 Secondary Data 
These types of data are most widely used for empirical studies of capital structure. For 
this study, various databases have been used to access secondary data in journals, such 
as Social Science Research Network (SSRN), IDEAS, Emerald and Business Source 
Premier.  
Quantitative data which is the main source of this study is required investigating the 
relationships in significant level will be collected from financial databases, such as 
DataStream, Fame and Thomson ONE Banker. To observe these financial figures from 
each and single of those listed UK companies on LSE would require much time and 
work. Hence using financial databases would save time for investigation of data and 
making comments on results. In addition to this, financial databases would help this 
study for producing more accurate and reliable results.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
For the purpose of this paper, the data is collected from secondary sources and 
researcher intends to use quantitative data and solely based on these data from 
DataStream. The financial information of listed UK companies will be analyzed on 
SPSS to examine whether there is significant correlation between leverage and its 
determinants.  
3.2.3 Data Sample 
Publicly listed companies available from DataStream will generate a sample. Companies 
that have missing financial information for any period of time within 2002-2009 will be 
eliminated. Also the companies in the financial sector, such as banks, financial 
institutions and insurance companies will not be included in the sample, since they are 
subject to characteristic rules and they have different structure of balance sheets from 
non-financial companies.  The data sample includes 202 companies which is listed in 
appendices, is chosen from FTSE 250, since it provides wide range of companies from 
numerous sectors.  As a result, the financial information of 202 companies in the period 
of 2002-2009 will form the final sample. 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In this paper, leverage is the dependent variable. Different measures of leverage are used 
in past papers and each leverage measure is defined in different way. In general, two 
most common proxies of leverage exist such as calculated at book value of equity and at 
market value of equity (Lööf, 2004). 
In the light of past researches (Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Ozkan (2001), Lööf (2004), Gaud et al. (2005) and Ramlall (2009)), as mentioned in 
literature review, six different leverage ratios are investigated, according to total debt, 
short-term debt and long-term debt at both book value and market value. 
 
Total Debt Ratio at Book Value (TDBV) =   Total Debt (Short-term + Long-term) / 
Total Assets 
Long-time Debt Ratio at Book Value (LDBV) = Long-term Debt / Total Assets 
Short-term Debt Ratio at Book Value (SDBV) = Short-term Debt / Total Assets 
 
Total Debt Ratio at Market Value (TDMV) =   Total Debt / (Market Value + Total Debt) 
Long-time Debt Ratio at Market Value (LDMV) = Long-term Debt / (Market Value + 
Total Debt) 
Short-term Debt Ratio at Market Value (SDMV) = Short-term Debt / (Market Value + 
Total Debt) 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
In this paper, profitability, size, growth, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, volatility and 
liquidity are suggested as independent variables. Proxies, as mentioned in literature 
review in details, are proposed for each of these independent variables.  
3.3.3 Model Specification 
In order to investigate relationship between leverage and independent variables, the 
model that was used by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan, Zingales (1995) and Bevan 
and Danbolt (2004) is used with a few adjustments as mentioned in Model C. Therefore 
the data from DataStream would be analysed based on following empirical model.  
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Leverage ∑ y Dy 1 P 2 S 3 G 4 T 5 NDTS 6 V 7 L 
 
α: Constant 
β: Regression coefficient 
Dy: Dummy variable representing year 
categorization 
P: Profitability 
S: Size 
G: Growth Opportunity 
T: Asset Tangibility 
NDTS: Non-debt Tax Shield 
V: Volatility 
L: Liquidity 
Following the methods from past empirical studies, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method is used for estimating the correlation coefficients of independent variables.  
Model A: 
In this model the relationships between capital structure and firm-level determinants of 
capital structure have been analysed in line with the empirical model stated above. The 
data are examined annually for the period of 2002-2009 by using SPSS. When analysed, 
three different leverage ratios would be used such as, total debt ratio at book value 
(TDBV),  long-time debt ratio at book value (LDBV) and short-term debt ratio at book 
value (SDBV). 
Model B: 
Model B is replication of Model A with the adjustment of gearing proxies. The data set 
are analysed annually for the same period. The gearing proxies are calculated at market 
value instead of book value. Total debt ratio at market value (TDMV), long-time debt 
ratio at market value (LDBV) and short-term debt ratio at market value (SDMV) are 
used as dependant variables for regression analyses.  
Model C:  
Model C is replication of Bevan and Danbolt (2004) and Bennett and Donnelly (1993) 
with some adjustments. These adjustments are including the data for both independent 
variable and dependent variables are averaged to isolate distortions as a result of short-
term variations and to reduce possible reverse causality between the independent and 
dependant variables. As an application of Bevan and Danbolt (2004) and Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993), all gearing ratios (TDBV, LDBV, LDBV, TDMV, LDMV, SDMV) 
calculated as an average from year 2004 to 2007 inclusively. Profitability is calculated 
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over period of the last 3 years from 2007 to 2009. Size is measured and averaged over 
the period 2002 to 2004. Growth is averaged for the last 3 years of data period from 
2007 to 2009. Tangibility is obtained from the middle 4 years of period, 2004 to 2007. 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) is measured also over the periods of 4 years. Volatility is 
calculated as an average over the 8-year period from 2002 to 2009. Liquidity is also 
averaged for the whole period of data.  
Model D:  
Model D combines Model A and Model B with a few adjustments. In this model, the 
data from 2002 to 2009 are pooled together and time dummy variables are added, while 
Model A and Model B excluded the time dummy variables. Year 2002 is taken into 
consideration as a baseline (reference category) and seven time dummies for years from 
2003 to 2009 are added to independent variables. The rationale behind adding time-
dummy variables is that they are control variables which capture the influence of the 
macroeconomics environment on leverage. In other words, adding time dummies to 
regression model allows capturing unobservable time specific factors on the 
macroeconomic level such as, interest rate, level of corporate taxation, economic 
situation and money supply (Lööf, 2004).  
The leverage proxies are calculated at both market value and book value. Total debt 
ratio at book value (TDBV), long-time debt ratio at book value (LDBV) and short-term 
debt ratio at book value (SDBV), total debt ratio at market value (TDMV), long-time 
debt ratio at market value (LDBV) and short-term debt ratio at market value (SDMV) 
are taken as dependant variables for Model D.  
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4. Results 
This chapter presents the results obtained from analysing Model A, Model B, Model C 
and Model D. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) of models investigated in line with 
significant level of 0.05. In the tables, the adjusted R² shows degree of variation in 
leverage ratio. Gajurel (2005) suggests that it is better to take adjusted R² rather than R² 
figure into account, since R² is more likely to produce positive results of the regressions. 
Adjusted R² figures vary between 3% - 25% in model A, 3% - 38% in Model B, 2% - 
43% in Model C and 7% - 34% in Model D. 
4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis is done in SPSS to test hypotheses. Before doing regression 
analysis, several descriptive statistics and multicollinearity are executed. For 
multicollinearity problem, bivariate correlations between the independent variables are 
investigated. To analyse pair-wise correlation, a data set which has 202 firms in 2002 is 
used.  
Table 3:     Pair-wise Correlations   
 
  
Variables X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
Gearing (X1) 1.000               
Profitability  (X2) -.110 1.000             
Size (X3) .206 -.185 1.000           
Growth (X4) -.049 .277 -.083 1.000         
Tangibility (X5) .328 .091 .113 .011 1.000       
Non-debt Tax Shield 
(X6) 
.061 .373 .009 -.004 .504 1.000     
Volatility (X7) -.107 .219 -.310 .149 -.156 .056 1.000   
Liquidity (X8) -.400 -.068 -.376 -.117 -.294 -.196 .157 1.000 
 
According to Lewis-Beck (1993), the pair-wise correlations must be smaller than 0.8 not 
to face multicollinearity problem in multiple regression analysis.  As seen in Table 2, 
there is no coefficient of pair-wise correlation larger than 0.8. Also it is possible to make 
some noticeable comments according to pair-wise correlations matrix. In line with the 
life-cycle theory, there is negative correlation between the growth rate and size of a 
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firm. As shown in Table 2, the coefficient of growth and size pair-wise correlation is, -
0.083, negative. Besides, profitability and size of a firm are negatively correlated, as 
expected.  
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Table 4:Descriptive 
Statistics 
           2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2002-09 
          Total Assets 
         Mean 4936.69 5071.51 5092.16 5749.55 6496.15 6836.80 8501.20 8647.68 6416.47 
Std Deviation 16562.88 16606.93 16154.64 18063.07 19690.24 19030.09 24672.46 24343.39 19656.02 
Minimum 7.27 20.31 21.84 25.48 33.63 41.40 40.09 50.95 7.27 
Maximum 162002.00 162226.00 146164.00 132365.00 145122.00 134173.40 191103.40 178054.10 191103.40 
          Total Debt 
         
Mean 1111.78 1145.64 1065.80 1103.52 1168.54 1454.02 1974.31 2075.65 1387.41 
Std Deviation 2648.06 2622.19 2313.30 2247.51 2432.62 3217.37 4358.58 4960.37 3259.36 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 18440.00 16004.00 14278.00 14219.00 19296.00 23600.82 27592.05 39920.00 39920.00 
          Gearing at Book Value 
         
Mean 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 
Std Deviation 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.19 1.17 1.84 0.86 1.18 0.94 0.88 0.68 1.84 
          Gearing at Market 
Value          
Mean 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.22 
Std Deviation 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.18 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 0.78 0.88 0.91 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.97 0.97 
 
         
EBITDA 
         
Mean 522.63 664.41 801.21 1000.00 945.71 1051.72 1199.75 1004.14 898.46 
Std Deviation 2006.78 2432.33 2706.23 3688.58 3740.48 3624.84 4194.38 3055.17 3257.10 
Minimum -3165.00 -5524.00 -80.00 -244.00 11926.00 -0.64 -1808.10 -641.40 -11926.00 
Maximum 15970.59 18169.60 21050.19 31410.08 31092.46 31730.19 34794.42 22205.28 34794.42 
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The descriptive statistics of the sample is presented in Table 3. This table simply proves 
how the study sample includes different range of companies in terms of total assets, debt 
and EBITDA. For instance, the study sample includes companies whose total assets are 
between GBP 7,270 and GBP 191 million. Furthermore, EBITDA of companies in the 
sample ranges from a minimum GBP -11.9 million to a maximum GBP 34.8 million. 
Also the data indicates that the amount of total debt ranges between zero and maximum 
level of GBP 39.9 million. Average total debt figure leveled off from 2002 to 2007. After 
2008 it has risen sharply and even doubled with the effect of global financial crisis. As 
seen in the Table 3, gearing ratios are presented at both book value and market value and 
ratios calculated in terms of book value are higher than in market value. In contrast to 
increase in total debt, both average gearing ratios demonstrate stability for the period of 
2002 – 2009.  
4.2 Model A 
In this model, the dependent variables are analyzed in line with the total debt ratio at book 
value (TDBV), long-time debt ratio at book value (LDBV) and short-term debt ratio at 
book value (SDBV). Summary of a regression analysis is presented on Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Summary of Model A 
    
Variables TDBV LDBV SDBV 
Profitability 
Negative                  
Except year 06 
Negative                    
Except yr 02 
Positive                         
Except yr 02, 03, 
09 
Size 
Positive                     
Except year 06 
Positive                         
Except year 06, 07 
Positive                         
Except yr 04 
Growth Ambiguous 
Negative                    
Except yr 06, 07, 08 
Positive                         
Except year 04 
Tangibility 
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Negative                    
Except year 02, 09 
NDTS 
Negative                    
Except year 02 
Negative                    
Except year 03, 04 
Negative 
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Volatility Negative Negative 
Negative                      
Significant 
Liquidity 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative                    
Except year 05 
Negative                    
Significant 
 
SPSS outs for per year with the figures of F (ANOVA), R², adjusted R² and coefficients 
for variables are shown in Table 6. Before discussing the multiple regression analysis in 
the model, it is proven that regressions for total and long-term debt ratios are significant. 
However the regressions which short-term debt ratio is employed as an independent 
variable are insignificant as seen in the Table 6.  
Profitability is negatively related to leverage for total debt and long-term debt ratios at 
book value. However, this correlation is ambiguous when short-term debt ratio is run, 
since it has six years positive relation and three years negative relation. Size has positive 
relationships for all three types of debt ratios but none of them significant. The results for 
growth are all different for each debt ratio measure and this conflict makes harder to 
interpret results. Therefore, Model B and Model C results are further investigated for this 
variable. There is significantly positive relationships between tangibility and total and 
long-term leverage, while the results for short-term leverage failed to show this 
relationship. According to Table 5, non-debt tax shield is negatively related to leverage, 
while there are several years with positive signs. The coefficient of volatility has negative 
sign in for all three types of leverage and it is significant for short-term leverage. There is 
a negative relationship between liquidity and gearing ratios and this relationship is 
significant for total and short-term gearing. 
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Table 6: Regression results of Model A for total debt ratio (TDBV), long-term debt ratio (LDBV) and short-term debt ratio (SDBV) at 
book value.  
Total Debt Book Value 
                        2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
7.38     7.47     7.29     6.23     5.75     9.76     8.15     8.08   
R2 
 
0.24     0.24     0.23     0.20     0.18     0.27     0.24     0.24   
Adj R2 
 
0.21     0.21     0.20     0.17     0.15     0.25     0.21     0.21   
Sign. 
 
0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.13 0.97 0.33 0.07 0.57 0.57 0.08 0.65 0.52 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.30 2.42 0.02 0.26 2.22 0.03 0.21 1.65 0.10 0.20 1.56 0.12 
Prof. -0.11 -1.49 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.15 -1.94 0.05 -0.15 -2.00 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.88 -0.06 -0.79 0.43 -0.26 -3.36 0.00 -0.11 -1.57 0.12 
Size 0.10 1.21 0.23 0.14 1.77 0.08 0.14 1.84 0.07 0.15 2.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.31 0.75 0.02 0.22 0.82 0.05 0.64 0.52 0.06 0.83 0.41 
Growth -0.30 -4.36 0.00 -0.21 -3.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.68 0.50 0.01 0.09 0.93 0.04 0.51 0.61 0.09 1.25 0.21 0.12 1.71 0.09 -0.10 -1.48 0.14 
Tangib. 0.17 2.14 0.03 0.21 2.54 0.01 0.26 3.29 0.00 0.32 3.91 0.00 0.31 3.71 0.00 0.38 4.99 0.00 0.36 4.48 0.00 0.36 4.58 0.00 
NDTS -0.03 -0.41 0.68 0.01 0.08 0.94 -0.03 -0.40 0.69 -0.02 -0.25 0.80 -0.14 -1.68 0.09 -0.19 -2.43 0.02 -0.11 -1.30 0.20 -0.13 -1.56 0.12 
Volat. -0.06 -0.74 0.46 -0.11 -1.32 0.19 -0.12 -1.50 0.14 -0.12 -1.59 0.11 -0.15 -2.03 0.04 -0.14 -2.16 0.03 -0.13 -1.87 0.06 -0.10 -1.51 0.13 
Liquid. -0.20 -2.49 0.01 -0.21 -2.71 0.01 -0.16 -2.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.64 0.53 -0.23 -3.08 0.00 -0.27 -3.64 0.00 -0.17 -2.29 0.02 -0.24 -3.34 0.00 
 
 
 
 
Long-Term Book Value 
                        2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
6.21     6.93     7.79     5.64     4.82     9.19     7.88     6.86   
R2 
 
0.21     0.22     0.24     0.19     0.16     0.26     0.23     0.21   
Adj R2 
 
0.18     0.19     0.21     0.16     0.12     0.23     0.20     0.18   
Sign. 
 
0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
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  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.08 0.58 0.56 0.01 0.07 0.94 -0.02 -0.15 0.88 -0.02 -0.15 0.88 -0.25 2.02 0.04 0.24 2.15 0.03 0.17 1.40 0.16 0.14 1.12 0.26 
Prof. -0.11 -1.45 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.92 -0.20 -2.66 0.01 -0.16 -2.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.34 0.73 -0.14 -1.79 0.07 -0.28 -3.65 0.00 -0.09 -1.23 0.22 
Size 0.10 1.15 0.25 0.13 1.65 0.10 0.16 2.16 0.03 0.14 1.76 0.08 -0.03 -0.47 0.64 -0.01 -0.22 0.83 0.03 0.45 0.66 0.06 0.83 0.41 
Growth -0.33 -4.71 0.00 -0.24 -3.48 0.00 -0.02 -0.29 0.77 -0.01 -0.14 0.89 0.02 0.33 0.74 0.08 1.13 0.26 0.12 1.75 0.08 -0.11 -1.71 0.09 
Tangib. 0.16 1.92 0.06 0.25 3.04 0.00 0.33 4.10 0.00 0.35 4.20 0.00 0.36 4.24 0.00 0.43 5.55 0.00 0.40 4.88 0.00 0.37 4.60 0.00 
NDTS -0.03 -0.41 0.68 0.03 0.33 0.74 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -0.02 -0.23 0.82 -0.13 -1.52 0.13 -0.14 -1.69 0.09 -0.10 -1.19 0.24 -0.11 -1.27 0.20 
Volat. -0.04 -0.47 0.64 -0.11 -1.37 0.17 -0.12 -1.46 0.15 -0.09 -1.24 0.22 -0.12 -1.67 0.10 -0.12 -1.72 0.09 -0.10 -1.47 0.14 -0.09 -1.27 0.21 
Liquid. -0.13 -1.61 0.11 -0.12 -1.50 0.14 -0.06 -0.73 0.47 0.01 0.11 0.91 -0.14 -1.81 0.07 -0.18 -2.44 0.02 -0.10 -1.31 0.19 -0.18 -2.47 0.01 
 
                          
Short-Term Book 
Value     
                        2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
2.20     2.71     2.71     2.46     3.75     4.30     1.84     2.57   
R2 
 
0.09     0.10     0.10     0.09     0.13     0.14     0.07     0.09   
Adj R2 
 
0.05     0.06     0.06     0.06     0.09     0.11     0.03     0.05   
Sign. 
 
0.03     0.01     0.01     0.02     0.00     0.00     0.08     0.02   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.07 1.39 0.17 0.06 1.41 0.16 0.12 2.79 0.01 0.02 0.72 0.47 0.06 1.39 0.17 0.02 0.49 0.63 0.04 0.81 0.42 0.05 1.54 0.12 
Prof. -0.01 -0.13 0.90 -0.02 -0.28 0.78 0.14 1.67 0.10 0.02 0.25 0.81 0.12 1.54 0.12 0.22 2.61 0.01 0.03 0.30 0.76 -0.07 -0.90 0.37 
Size 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.05 0.55 0.58 -0.10 -1.22 0.22 0.08 1.01 0.31 0.03 0.45 0.65 0.09 1.21 0.23 0.04 0.55 0.58 0.01 0.20 0.85 
Growth 0.06 0.80 0.42 0.07 0.91 0.36 -0.09 -1.08 0.28 0.06 0.78 0.44 0.05 0.62 0.54 0.04 0.48 0.63 0.01 0.10 0.92 0.07 1.00 0.32 
Tangib. 0.08 0.88 0.38 -0.09 -1.05 0.30 -0.08 -0.90 0.37 -0.08 -0.86 0.39 -0.12 -1.35 0.18 -0.07 -0.88 0.38 -0.04 -0.44 0.66 0.01 0.06 0.95 
NDTS -0.01 -0.12 0.91 -0.06 -0.67 0.50 -0.14 -1.58 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -0.05 -0.61 0.54 -0.20 -2.27 0.02 -0.04 -0.43 0.67 -0.11 -1.23 0.22 
Volat. -0.08 -0.85 0.40 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -0.06 -0.70 0.48 -0.11 -1.31 0.19 -0.09 -1.25 0.21 -0.11 -1.46 0.14 -0.09 -1.22 0.23 -0.06 -0.87 0.38 
Liquid. -0.23 -2.66 0.01 -0.30 -3.64 0.00 -0.29 -3.45 0.00 -0.22 -2.73 0.01 -0.32 -4.14 0.00 -0.29 -3.68 0.00 -0.22 -2.68 0.01 -0.25 -3.26 0.00 
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4.3 Model B 
In Model B, the dependent variables are investigated with significance level of 0.05 for 
the total debt ratio at market value (TDMV), long-time debt ratio at market value 
(LDMV) and short-term debt ratio at market value (SDMV). Observations, derived from 
Model B, are presented on Table 7. The more detailed yearly results with the statistics 
are illustrated in Table 8 and as seen, the regressions for total and long-term gearing are 
significant. Likewise in Model A, the regressions for short-term gearing are 
insignificant.  
Table 7: Summary of Model B 
    
Variables TDMV LDMV SDMV 
Profitability Negative            
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative             
Except year 07 
Size Positive Positive 
Positive             
Except year 02, 04 
Growth Negative  Negative 
Negative             
Except year 03 
Tangibility Positive     
Positive                
Significant 
Negative             
Except year 02, 04 
NDTS Negative 
Negative               
Except year 04 
Negative            
Except year 03 
Volatility Negative Negative 
Negative               
Except year 03 
Liquidity Negative 
Negative              
Except year 05 
Negative              
Significant 
 
The regression coefficients of profitability are negative and significant for total and 
long-term leverage. As in Model A, company size positively related to gearing. Contrary 
to Model A, all forms of leverages are inversely related to companies‟ growth rates. 
Also it is found that long-term gearing has positive and significant relationship with 
asset structure (tangibility). Similarly Model A, non-debt tax shield and volatility are 
negatively related to all type of gearing measures. As clearly seen in Table 7, liquidity 
has inverse relationship with all form of leverage and this relationship is significant for 
short-term leverage.  
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Table 8: Regression results of Model B for total debt ratio (TDMV), long-term debt ratio (LDMV) and short-term debt ratio (SDMV) at 
market value. 
 
 
Total Debt Market Value 
                       2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
8.72     10.9     15.4     15.0     17.8     15.9     16.7     16.3   
R2 
 
0.27     0.31     0.39     0.38     0.41     0.38     0.39     0.38   
Adj R2 
 
0.24     0.28     0.37     0.35     0.38     0.36     0.37     0.36   
Sign. 
 
0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.21 1.63 0.11 0.11 0.83 0.41 0.08 0.69 0.49 -0.04 -0.42 0.68 0.09 1.03 0.30 0.11 1.19 0.23 0.16 1.44 0.15 0.17 1.13 0.26 
Prof. -0.13 -1.83 0.07 -0.35 -5.37 0.00 -0.38 -5.60 0.00 -0.31 -4.76 0.00 -0.30 -4.56 0.00 -0.28 -3.87 0.00 -0.42 -6.20 0.00 -0.44 -6.74 0.00 
Size 0.01 0.13 0.90 0.12 1.60 0.11 0.15 2.18 0.03 0.21 3.20 0.00 0.11 1.85 0.07 0.09 1.48 0.14 0.10 1.59 0.11 0.12 1.95 0.05 
Growth -0.17 -2.59 0.01 -0.05 -0.77 0.44 -0.06 -0.93 0.35 -0.13 -1.91 0.06 -0.02 -0.40 0.69 -0.01 -0.09 0.93 -0.06 -1.04 0.30 -0.13 -2.16 0.03 
Tangib. 0.37 4.69 0.00 0.33 4.22 0.00 0.36 5.01 0.00 0.39 5.43 0.00 0.50 7.03 0.00 0.47 6.59 0.00 0.35 4.87 0.00 0.29 4.07 0.00 
NDTS -0.10 -1.22 0.23 -0.02 -0.30 0.77 -0.01 -0.13 0.90 -0.05 -0.73 0.47 -0.19 -2.59 0.01 -0.20 -2.66 0.01 -0.07 -0.92 0.36 -0.03 -0.43 0.67 
Volat. -0.23 -2.83 0.01 -0.11 -1.38 0.17 -0.10 -1.36 0.18 -0.08 -1.27 0.21 -0.14 -2.24 0.03 -0.10 -1.55 0.12 -0.10 -1.58 0.11 -0.06 -1.00 0.32 
Liquid. -0.11 -1.39 0.17 -0.13 -1.78 0.08 -0.11 -1.55 0.12 -0.04 -0.60 0.55 -0.12 -1.83 0.07 -0.13 -1.97 0.05 -0.18 -2.78 0.01 -0.18 -2.82 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
Long-term Debt Market Value 
                      2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
7.71     9.42     14.4     13.3     14.8     15.9     14.2     13.5   
R2 
 
0.25     0.28     0.37     0.35     0.36     0.38     0.36     0.34   
Adj R2 
 
0.22     0.25     0.35     0.33     0.34     0.36     0.33     0.32   
Sign. 
 
0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
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  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.12 1.00 0.32 0.02 0.15 0.88 0.02 0.18 0.86 -0.06 -0.54 0.59 0.08 0.97 0.33 0.11 1.35 0.18 0.17 1.56 0.12 0.14 0.92 0.36 
Prof. -0.12 -1.69 0.09 -0.27 -4.09 0.00 -0.38 -5.47 0.00 -0.31 -4.58 0.00 -0.28 -4.18 0.00 -0.34 -4.71 0.00 -0.41 -5.89 0.00 -0.40 -5.95 0.00 
Size 0.03 0.42 0.67 0.13 1.63 0.10 0.15 2.18 0.03 0.19 2.72 0.01 0.08 1.19 0.23 0.07 1.17 0.24 0.06 0.90 0.37 0.11 1.66 0.10 
Growth -0.19 -2.81 0.01 -0.09 -1.41 0.16 -0.05 -0.72 0.48 -0.11 -1.70 0.09 -0.02 -0.33 0.74 -0.01 -0.19 0.85 -0.05 -0.74 0.46 -0.13 -2.19 0.03 
Tangib. 0.38 4.69 0.00 0.38 4.81 0.00 0.39 5.34 0.00 0.43 5.82 0.00 0.53 7.29 0.00 0.46 6.40 0.00 0.39 5.24 0.00 0.32 4.39 0.00 
NDTS -0.10 -1.27 0.21 -0.02 -0.23 0.82 0.01 0.09 0.93 -0.05 -0.65 0.52 -0.18 -2.42 0.02 -0.11 -1.48 0.14 -0.08 -1.07 0.29 -0.03 -0.43 0.67 
Volat. -0.22 -2.60 0.01 -0.13 -1.62 0.11 -0.09 -1.31 0.19 -0.06 -0.95 0.34 -0.11 -1.76 0.08 -0.08 -1.33 0.18 -0.07 -1.17 0.24 -0.05 -0.82 0.41 
Liquid. -0.04 -0.47 0.64 -0.04 -0.52 0.60 -0.04 -0.61 0.54 0.02 0.25 0.80 -0.06 -0.83 0.41 -0.09 -1.31 0.19 -0.14 -2.05 0.04 -0.13 -2.03 0.04 
 
 
 
 
                        
Short-term Debt Market Value 
                      2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009   
F 
 
1.69     4.97     2.36     3.00     4.88     4.92     2.89     4.57   
R2 
 
0.07     0.17     0.09     0.11     0.16     0.16     0.10     0.15   
Adj R2 
 
0.03     0.14     0.05     0.07     0.12     0.13     0.07     0.12   
Sign. 
 
0.11     0.00     0.03     0.01     0.00     0.00     0.01     0.00   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Const. 0.10 1.78 0.08 0.09 1.89 0.06 0.08 2.33 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.70 0.01 0.24 0.81 -0.01 -0.40 0.69 -0.01 -0.25 0.80 0.08 0.86 0.39 
Prof. -0.05 -0.63 0.53 -0.31 -4.29 0.00 -0.08 -0.94 0.35 -0.07 -0.88 0.38 -0.11 -1.38 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.94 -0.10 -1.15 0.25 -0.26 -3.44 0.00 
Size -0.06 -0.68 0.50 0.02 0.22 0.83 -0.03 -0.39 0.69 0.13 1.66 0.10 0.15 2.04 0.04 0.20 2.71 0.01 0.15 1.96 0.05 0.10 1.33 0.19 
Growth -0.03 -0.35 0.73 0.11 1.50 0.13 -0.06 -0.75 0.46 -0.07 -0.88 0.38 -0.02 -0.24 0.81 -0.06 -0.82 0.41 -0.07 -0.88 0.38 0.00 -0.03 0.98 
Tangib. 0.09 1.05 0.29 -0.06 -0.76 0.45 0.02 0.19 0.85 -0.06 -0.72 0.47 -0.03 -0.33 0.74 -0.01 -0.18 0.86 -0.07 -0.79 0.43 -0.06 -0.77 0.44 
NDTS -0.02 -0.23 0.82 -0.02 -0.23 0.82 -0.11 -1.27 0.21 -0.02 -0.28 0.78 -0.06 -0.65 0.51 -0.16 -1.87 0.06 0.03 0.37 0.71 -0.01 -0.09 0.93 
Volat. -0.12 -1.26 0.21 0.03 0.36 0.72 -0.06 -0.67 0.50 -0.08 -1.06 0.29 -0.11 -1.53 0.13 -0.09 -1.29 0.20 -0.09 -1.20 0.23 -0.05 -0.73 0.46 
Liquid. -0.19 -2.14 0.03 -0.29 -3.57 0.00 -0.25 -2.95 0.00 -0.21 -2.65 0.01 -0.23 -3.03 0.00 -0.24 -2.99 0.00 -0.17 -2.11 0.04 -0.24 -3.17 0.00 
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4.4 Model C 
In model C, which is a replication of Bevan and Danbolt (2004) and Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993) study, the variables are averaged to reduce distortions. In line with the 
past researches, as mentioned in methodology, six different leverage ratios are 
investigated such as, total debt, short-term debt and long-term debt at both book value 
and market value. The summaries of results derived from Model C are presented in 
Table 9. Regression results such as F (analysis of variance), R², adjusted R² and 
coefficients for variables are illustrated in more details in Table 10.  
 
Table 9: Summary of Model C 
       Variables TDBV LDBV SDBV TDMV LDMV SDMV 
Profitability Negative Negative Positive 
Negative        
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative 
Size Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Growth Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative Positive 
Tangibility 
Positive                 
Significant 
Positive                 
Significant 
Negative 
Positive          
Significant 
Positive               
Significant 
Positive 
NDTS Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative No Relation 
Volatility Positive No Relation Positive Negative Negative Negative 
Liquidity 
Negative               
Significant 
Negative Negative 
Negative        
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative 
 
Profitability has inverse relationship with all form of leverage except short-term leverage 
at book value. Likewise Model A and Model B, size of company is positively related to 
leverage. Growth ratio has negative relationships with total and long-term gearings, but 
has positive relationships with short-term gearings. As seen in Table 9, tangibility has 
ambiguous relationships with all forms gearings. As expected, it is observed that non-
debt tax shield and liquidity are inversely related to gearing ratios. Surprisingly, 
volatility is negatively related to leverages at book value and positively related to 
leverages at market value.  
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Table 10: Regression results of Model C for total debt ratio (TDBV), long-term debt ratio (LDBV), short-term debt ratio (SDBV) at 
book value and total debt ratio (TDMV), long-term debt ratio (LDMV) and short-term debt ratio (SDMV) at market value. 
 
 
Model C 
                      TDBV     LDBV     SDBV     TDMV     LDMV     STMV   
F   8.54     8.30     1.85     21.7     18.1     1.45   
R2   0.25     0.24     0.07     0.45     0.41     0.05   
Adj R2   0.22     0.21     0.03     0.43     0.39     0.02   
Significance   0.00     0.00     0.08     0.00     0.00     0.19   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Constant 0.28 2.47 0.01 0.25 2.26 0.03 0.06 1.60 0.11 0.23 2.57 0.01 0.21 2.35 0.02 0.07 1.26 0.21 
Profitability -0.10 -1.33 0.19 -0.12 -1.56 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.98 -0.36 -5.72 0.00 -0.36 -5.39 0.00 -0.12 -1.48 0.14 
Size 0.03 0.44 0.66 0.01 0.16 0.87 0.02 0.19 0.85 0.06 1.03 0.30 0.04 0.59 0.55 0.02 0.20 0.84 
Growth -0.07 -1.02 0.31 -0.09 -1.26 0.21 0.07 0.91 0.37 -0.10 -1.78 0.08 -0.10 -1.65 0.10 0.04 0.48 0.63 
Tangibility 0.30 3.87 0.00 0.34 4.40 0.00 -0.03 -0.39 0.70 0.40 6.05 0.00 0.41 5.98 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.91 
NDTS -0.12 -1.52 0.13 -0.11 -1.32 0.19 -0.09 -1.00 0.32 -0.07 -0.94 0.35 -0.04 -0.61 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Volatility 0.04 0.62 0.54 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.13 1.65 0.10 -0.07 -1.10 0.27 -0.04 -0.69 0.49 -0.08 -1.07 0.29 
Liquidity -0.35 -4.71 0.00 -0.28 -3.86 0.00 -0.21 -2.61 0.01 -0.25 -3.94 0.00 -0.21 -3.26 0.00 -0.14 -1.74 0.08 
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4.5 Model D:  
In Model D, as a combination of Model A and Model B with time dummies, six leverage 
ratios (TDBV, LDBV, SDVB, TDMV, LDMV and SDMV) are calculated. Since year 
2002 is taken as reference year, it is omitted from dummy variables. The table below 
shows a summary of the regression results with time dummies. 
 
Table 11: Summary of Model D 
 
  
  
   Variables TDBV LDBV SDBV TDMV LDMV SDMV 
Profitability 
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative                 
Significant 
Positive  
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative                
Significant 
Negative                
Significant 
Size Positive  Positive  Positive  
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive  
Growth 
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative                 
Significant 
Positive  
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative 
Tangibility 
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Negative  
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Negative 
NDTS Negative     Negative     Negative 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative 
Volatility 
Negative                    
Significant 
Negative                    
Significant 
Negative 
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative                 
Significant 
Negative 
Liquidity 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative                    
Significant 
Negative            
Significant 
Negative 
Negative                    
Significant 
Dummy 
2003 
Negative     Positive Negative     
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Positive 
Dummy 
2004 
Negative     Positive Negative     Positive                   Positive Negative     
Dummy 
2005 
Negative     Positive 
Negative                    
Significant 
Positive Positive 
Negative                    
Significant 
Dummy 
2006 
Positive  Positive Negative     Negative Positive 
Negative                 
Significant 
Dummy 
2007 
Negative     Positive Negative     Negative Positive 
Negative                    
Significant 
Dummy 
2008 
Positive  Positive Negative     Positive Positive 
Negative                 
Significant 
Dummy 
2009 
Negative     Positive 
Negative                    
Significant 
Positive        
Significant 
Positive                    
Significant 
Negative 
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Regression results with the figures of F (ANOVA), R², adjusted R² and regression 
coefficients for independent variables including time dummies are indicated in details in 
Table 12. 
Similar to previous models, profitability is negatively and significantly related to 
leverage, except for short-term leverage at book value. The regression coefficients of 
size are positive for gearing ratios and they are significant for total and long-term 
leverage at market value. Likely Model C, growth measure has negative and also 
significant relationships with total and long-term leverages, while it has positive 
relationship with short-term leverage at book value. Contrary to growth, tangibility is 
positively and significantly correlated to all types of leverage except for short-term. 
Similarly to all models, non-debt tax shield has reverse relationships with leverage. As 
expected, volatility and liquidity are negatively correlated to all leverage figures.  
Surprisingly, time dummies have generally insignificant influence on leverage. The 
relations and correlation signs are inconsistent for time dummy variables. As seen in 
Table 11, Model D indicates insignificant time-specific effects. It needs a further 
extensive investigation to observe its influence. 
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Table 12: Regression results of Model D for total debt ratio (TDBV), long-term debt ratio (LDBV), short-term debt ratio (SDBV) at 
book value and total debt ratio (TDMV), long-term debt ratio (LDMV) and short-term debt ratio (SDMV) at market value. 
 
Model D 
                  
    TDBV     LDBV     SDBV     TDMV     LDMV     SDMV   
F 
 
25.92     23.10     11.08     53.26     47.60     13.50   
R² 
 
0.20     0.18     0.07     0.34     0.33     0.12   
Adj R² 
 
0.19     0.18     0.09     0.33     0.21     0.11   
Signif. 
 
0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
  Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Constant 0.18 3.97 0.00 0.11 2.58 0.01 0.07 4.61 0.00 0.07 1.71 0.09 0.03 0.68 0.50 0.04 3.19 0.00 
Profitability -0.10 -4.04 0.00 -0.11 -4.50 0.00 0.03 1.03 0.30 -0.27 -11.9 0.00 -0.25 -11.0 0.00 -0.12 -4.56 0.00 
Size 0.07 2.59 0.01 0.06 2.28 0.02 0.03 1.04 0.30 0.12 4.92 0.00 0.10 4.31 0.00 0.08 2.78 0.01 
Growth -0.07 -2.90 0.00 -0.09 -3.59 0.00 0.05 1.82 0.07 -0.10 -4.34 0.00 -0.10 -4.45 0.00 -0.02 -0.70 0.49 
Tangibility 0.29 10.45 0.00 0.32 11.4 0.00 -0.05 -1.76 0.08 0.37 14.49 0.00 0.40 15.20 0.00 -0.01 -0.46 0.65 
NDTS -0.08 -2.72 0.01 -0.06 -2.19 0.03 -0.06 -1.88 0.06 -0.10 -3.98 0.00 -0.09 -3.56 0.00 -0.04 -1.24 0.21 
Volatility -0.13 -5.00 0.00 -0.12 -4.40 0.00 -0.06 -2.29 0.02 -0.12 -5.14 0.00 -0.12 -4.75 0.00 -0.06 -2.02 0.04 
Liquidity -0.18 -6.97 0.00 -0.11 -4.03 0.00 -0.26 -9.36 0.00 -0.11 -4.82 0.00 -0.06 -2.42 0.02 -0.21 -7.78 0.00 
D_2003 0.00 -0.12 0.91 0.00 0.08 0.94 -0.02 -0.60 0.55 0.10 3.36 0.00 0.09 3.16 0.00 0.04 1.13 0.26 
D_2004 -0.03 -0.83 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.97 -0.09 -2.68 0.01 0.03 0.95 0.34 0.06 1.91 0.06 -0.09 -2.64 0.01 
D_2005 -0.02 -0.65 0.52 0.02 0.47 0.64 -0.11 -3.36 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.70 0.04 1.46 0.14 -0.10 -3.03 0.00 
D_2006 0.00 0.04 0.97 0.03 0.78 0.44 -0.08 -2.24 0.03 -0.02 -0.71 0.48 0.01 0.31 0.76 -0.11 -3.16 0.00 
D_2007 -0.01 -0.16 0.87 0.03 0.76 0.45 -0.10 -2.80 0.01 -0.04 -1.43 0.15 0.00 -0.08 0.93 -0.15 -4.23 0.00 
D_2008 0.01 0.16 0.87 0.04 1.07 0.28 -0.09 -2.73 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.85 0.04 1.35 0.18 -0.11 -3.35 0.00 
D_2009 -0.03 -1.01 0.31 0.02 0.53 0.60 -0.16 -4.65 0.00 0.13 4.25 0.00 0.16 5.42 0.00 -0.09 -2.66 0.01 
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5. Findings 
This chapter includes seven subsections such as profitability, size, growth, tangibility, 
non-debt tax shield, volatility and liquidity. In these sections, results, as investigated in 
chapter four, from different regression models will be incorporated with past empirical 
studies results and capital structure theories. 
5.1 Profitability 
Profitability is measured as by ratio of EBITDA to total assets. The regression results of 
models have shown that profitability is negatively related to leverage except for short-
term debt ratio and it is significant for leverage ratios at market value. Thus, the 
hypothesis H1 holds true and profitable companies do not prefer higher ratio of debt, 
even the potential bankruptcy risk becomes lower with the high profit figures. These 
results are supported by the pecking order theory. According to pecking order theory, 
companies which are profitable prefer retained earnings as a primary source of financing 
new investments. This finding implies that profitable companies prefer internal 
financing rather than external financing. On the other hand, the negative sign of 
profitability does not support the trade off theory. Trade off theory suggest that 
companies with the figures of high profit tend to have higher leverage and more taxable 
income to shield (Barclay and Smith, 2005). Therefore, this theory fails to prove why 
profitable companies have relatively less debt ratio. Also the results are in line with the 
findings of past studies of Gaud et al. (2005), Ozkan (2001) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995).  
Unexpectedly, there is positive relationship between profitability and leverage for both 
short-term book value debt ratio in Model A and Model C. Jensen (1986) states that 
profitability might be positively related to leverage. The interpretation of this result 
might be suppliers of debt (banks and financial institutions) are more likely to lend to 
companies which have high profit figures (Ozkan, 2001). 
5.2 Size 
The proxy of natural logarithm of sales is used for size. The regression result of all 
models proves that size is positively related to all forms of leverage ratio. Therefore the 
hypothesis (H2A, H2B and H2C) which claim there is a positive relationship between 
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size and total, long-term and short term leverage, hold true. The results illustrate that the 
bigger the company in terms of sales, the larger amount of debt it has in its capital 
structure. This finding is consistent with static trade off theory, as mention in literature 
review. The risk of bankruptcy for larger a company is less than smaller a company. The 
reason behind this could be, larger companies „too big to fail‟, since they operate in large 
scales and more diversified. As a result, small companies tend to borrow less than larger 
ones.  
It is worth to make note that in Model A and Model B, for several years the relationship 
between size and short-term leverage at book value and market value has negative sign. 
In Model C, where the size is averaged over the period 2002 to 2004, and Model D, the 
relationship between size and short-term debt is positive. The explanation behind this 
might be smaller companies tend to employ more short-term debt rather than long-term 
debt in their capital structure. In addition to this, Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that 
the effect of size on short-term leverage is unclear.  Although the hypothesis H2C holds 
true, detailed analysis for size measure is necessary. 
 The results of three models support the findings of empirical studies of Ozkan (2001), 
Gaud et al. (2005) and Gajurel (2005). 
5.3 Growth Opportunity 
Growth is proxied as market to book ratio in this study. In Model A the results differ 
according to type of leverage. In Model B, growth is negatively related to leverage. In 
Model C, there is negative relationship between growth and total debt and long-term 
debt ratio, while this relationship is positive for short-term debt ratios (both market and 
book value). Lastly in Model D, growth opportunity is significantly and negatively 
related to leverage except for short-term leverage. Practically, all is taken into 
consideration; there is negative relationship between growth and leverage and therefore 
the hypothesis H3 holds true, even though these findings does not prove any expressive 
assumption. 
The results show that changes in natural logarithm of sales have no meaningful effects 
on growth.  In consonance with the results, companies with high growth rates are more 
likely to have higher cost of bankruptcy and less amount of debt in capital structure.  
However, this finding is consistent with the pecking order theory. According to this 
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theory, the company prefers retained earnings as first source of financing itself instead 
of debt. Therefore there is inverse relationship between growth and leverage. 
Also Ozkan (2001) explains this relationship that „it stems from the tendency of firms to 
issue stock when their stock price is high relative to earnings or book value‟ and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) further states that „this implies the negative correlation between 
leverage and market to book ratio is driven largely by firms that issue significant 
amounts of equity‟.  
5.4 Asset Tangibility 
The proxy for tangibility is taken as ratio of fixed asset to total assets. The results from 
regression indicate that there is mix correlation between tangibility and leverage types. 
In Model A, Model B, Model C and Model D, asset structure is positively related to total 
and long-term gearing and statistically significant. Contrary, it is negatively correlated to 
short-term gearing at both book and market value. Hence, the hypothesis H4A and H4B 
which claim positive correlation between tangibility and total and long-term leverage 
hold true.   
However, the results regarding the positive correlation for short-term leverage rejects the 
hypothesis H4C and this finding is line with studies of Bevan and Danbolt (2000) and 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008). 
The findings are consistent with the theory, which suggests companies having higher 
collateral assets are more likely to have high level of debt ratios. The explanation behind 
this is that tangible asset is easy to collateralize and therefore it decrease the agency cost 
of debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Besides, the results are in alignment with the agency 
cost theory, since debt providers claims securities as collateral to put them in more 
secure position.  
The asset structure of companies contributes crucially to the variation in leverage and 
this evidence agrees that companies are more likely to employ long-term debt for fixed 
assets and short-term debt for current assets. Also studies of Bennett and Donnelly 
(1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Gaud et al. (2003) have found evidences that 
support this correlation.  
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5.5 Non-debt Tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shield is proxied as ratio of annual depreciation to total assets. The results 
from Model A, Model B, Model C and Model D are in consistent with each other. The 
results illustrate that non-debt tax shield and all forms of leverage are correlated 
negatively, although there are evidence of positive correlation for a few years in Model 
A and Model B. In general, the hypothesis H5 holds true according to findings of this 
empirical study, although the results are not significant for several years.  
This finding is in line with static trade-off theory. Companies that have higher non-debt 
tax shields, tend to have less long-term debt ratio rather than other companies. 
It is worth to make note that the relations between this variable and leverage are more 
robust under the market value rather than book value. In addition, the findings are 
consistent with past empirical studies such as, Wald (1999), Ozkan (2001), Gaud et Al 
(2005) and Gajurel (2005). 
5.6 Volatility 
Standard deviation of EBITDA has been takes as a proxy of volatility and the results 
indicate ambiguous relation between this variable and leverage.  
In Model A and Model B, the findings illustrate that volatility is negatively related to 
leverage and this relation is significant under the short-term leverage at book value. In 
Model D, the relationship between volatility and all types of leverage is negative and 
significant. 
The theory states that companies that have high level of operation volatility tend to have 
low level of debt ratio (Myers, 2001). Also Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008) study support 
this finding. 
On the other hand, the results from Model C shows that there is positive relation 
between volatility and three types of leverage at book value, while there is negative 
relation for volatility for leverages at market value. This inconsistency may arise from 
using averaged figures for different period of time in Model C. The positive relation 
between this variable and leverage at book value supports the theory which states 
companies that are exposed to high market risk are expected to have high level of 
leverage. Moreover, the study of Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and Oztekin (2009) 
support this evidence. 
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In general, the hypothesis H6 holds true, even though there are some inconsistencies.  
5.7 Liquidity 
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities has been used as a proxy of liquidity. All 
the results from Model A, Model B, Model C and Model D are in line with each other 
and liquidity of companies contributes significantly to the variation in leverage. 
All these results illustrate that there is significant negative relationships between 
liquidity and all types of leverage. Therefore, the hypothesis H7 does hold true and it is 
noteworthy that the outcomes of Model C and Model D are more robust than other 
models. 
The results are in consistent with the theory of liquidity level of companies implies 
lower level of leverage. According to Ozkan (2001), this inverse relation may arise from 
potential conflicts between shareholders and debt holders of the company. Namely, 
companies with high level of liquidity have more liquid assets and hold less amount of 
debt which results in lower leverage.  
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6. Conclusion 
The final section of this paper consists of the summary and reviews previous section‟s 
findings in consideration of capital structure theories and empirical researches. The 
limitations of study and recommendation for further researches are also presented in this 
section. 
This research in general aims to examine the patterns and possible capital structure 
determinants. The main objective is to investigate the relationships between leverage 
ratios and firm-level determinants (profitability, size, growth opportunities, asset 
tangibility, non-debt tax shield, volatility and liquidity). This research covers 202 listed 
UK companies from FTSE 250 for the time period from 2002 to 2009.  
Four different models are examined and the results generally show that there are 
negative relationships between leverage and profitability, growth, non-debt tax shield, 
volatility and liquidity, while there are positive relationships between leverage ratios and 
size and asset tangibility. Profitability, asset tangibility and liquidity are generally 
significantly related to leverage and these correlations are more evident in terms of 
leverage at market value. The unobserved time variant effects are represented by time 
dummies in Model D and time dummies have not significant influence on leverage. In 
other words, unobserved time variant effects have no determining influence for listed 
UK companies.  
In general, the researcher finds that the results are much significant and successful, when 
either total or long-term leverage is the dependent variable. This evidence demonstrates 
that total and long-term leverage are more representative of companies‟ capital structure 
than short-tem leverage. Also the researcher finds that the regression results are more 
significant when the market value of equity is used as proxy of leverage than book value 
of equity. It is noteworthy to highlight that total leverage at market value of equity is the 
most important dependent variable as a proxy of capital structure, followed by long-term 
leverage at market value of equity.  
As mentioned in previous chapter, regression results are consistent with different capital 
structure theories. The negative sign of association between profitability and total and 
long-term debt supports the pecking order theory. However the relationship between size 
and leverage supports the static trade off theory. The positive sign of correlations 
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between tangibility and long-term leverage are consistent with agency theory. In 
addition to this, the negative association between non-debt tax shield and leverage 
supports static trade off theory.  
Also the past papers, as mention fully in findings chapter, found evidences which 
support different capital structure theories. For instance, Gaud et al. (2005) find negative 
correlation between profitability and leverage, whilst Jensen (1986) supports positive 
relationship between them.  
To sum things up, although there are some contradictions and inconsistencies between 
capital structure theories, they complement each other to determine and verify the 
relationships between leverage and firm-level determinants.  
6.1 Limitations of Study 
Several limitations were noted in related to this research which is noteworthy to be 
underlined. First of all time constrain was important limitation for this research. The 
time limited the sample size (number of companies) and period of study. Number of 
companies would have been raised more than 202 and not only listed UK companies but 
also unlisted companies could have been incorporated in this research. Time period of 
this research could have been expanded to have more consistent and robust results.  
Secondly, the imperfect data was another limitation for this research. After collecting 
data from secondary sources, some missing figures are detected. Hence the final sample 
size has been decreased to 202 companies. Moreover, where possible, some missing 
values of companies replaced with their mean values and possible it may cause to 
produce imprecise and distorted data.  Besides, since this research study is based on 
cross-section data for the purpose of this paper, the data may not present the changes in 
assets and debts over time.  
Thirdly, only limited numbers of proxies for are used for both dependent and 
independent variables, due to limited amount of time. Some alternative proxies could 
have been taken into take account to produce more reliable and robust results.  
Last but not least, the potential endogeneity of capital structure is another limitation of 
this study, as a shortcoming of OLS method which used in this research study 
(Maghyereh, 2005). Moreover, the dynamic effect of capital structure is neglected.  
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6.2 Recommendation for Further Research 
Taking into consideration more alternative proxy measures for independent variables 
can expand this empirical study. As mention in previous subsection, using different 
proxies would enable to produce more reliable and accurate results.  
Only companies from FTSE 250 are selected for this research study. Although FTSE 
250 companies represent more than 80% of the UK economy, it can not present of the 
entire population. Therefore sample size of further research could be extended with 
unlisted and small-medium companies for more comprehensive investigation. Also 
adding industry classification to regression models as dummy variables would be helpful 
to examine the relationships in terms of industry segment.  
The time period of this study is set for only 8 years (2002 - 2009), due to time 
limitations as mentioned above. The further research could extend this period of time 
and it leads to examining capital structure over long time period to produce more 
reliable and accurate results.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of companies 
Name DS Mnemonic DS Code 
AGGREKO AGK 892907 
AMEC AMEC 901788 
ANGLO AMERICAN AAL 903076 
ANTOFAGASTA ANTO 926288 
ARM HOLDINGS ARM 679297 
ARRIVA ARI 914151 
ASHTEAD GROUP AHT 906045 
ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS ABF 900825 
ASTRAZENECA AZN 319608 
ATKINS (WS) ATK 882044 
AUTONOMY CORP. AU. 269281 
AVEVA GROUP AVV 882839 
BABCOCK INTL. BAB 900552 
BAE SYSTEMS BA. 901419 
BALFOUR BEATTY BBY 900494 
BARR (AG) BRAG 914023 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS BDEV 906309 
BBA AVIATION BBA 900293 
BELLWAY BLWY 904076 
BERKELEY GROUP HDG.(THE) BKG 974117 
BG GROUP BG. 911488 
BHP BILLITON BLT 899188 
BODYCOTE BODY 910119 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP BVS 671226 
BP BP. 900995 
BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 914447 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BATS 901295 
BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP BSY 135116 
BRITVIC BVIC 32480C 
BROWN (N) GROUP BRWN 914327 
BSS GROUP BTSM 900578 
BT GROUP BT.A 900888 
BTG BGC 139996 
BUNZL BNZL 901067 
BURBERRY GROUP BRBY 25968K 
CABLE & WIRELESS COMMS. CWC 901634 
CAIRN ENERGY CNE 910146 
CAPITA GROUP CPI 953830 
50 
 
CARILLION CLLN 684990 
CARNIVAL CCL 265148 
CARPETRIGHT CPR 319752 
CENTAMIN EGYPT NPV (LON) CEY 257827 
CENTRICA CNA 888276 
CHARTER INTL. CHTR 901016 
CHEMRING GROUP CMRG 914073 
CHLORIDE GROUP CHLD 900930 
COBHAM COB 904313 
COLT GROUP COLT 870717 
COMPASS GROUP CPG 255049 
COMPUTACENTER CCC 679947 
CONNAUGHT CNT 690266 
COOKSON GROUP CKSN 900433 
CRANSWICK CWK 914038 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL CRDA 900476 
DAILY MAIL 'A' DMGT 910716 
DAIRY CREST DCG 882065 
DANA PETROLEUM DNX 943973 
DAVIS SERVICE GROUP DVSG 900954 
DE LA RUE DLAR 901343 
DEBENHAMS DEB 35793C 
DIAGEO DGE 900251 
DIMENSION DATA HDG. DDT 298320 
DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES DNO 910043 
DOMINO'S PIZZA DOM 278612 
DRAX GROUP DRXG 32545E 
DSG INTERNATIONAL DSGI 900906 
EASYJET EZJ 280641 
ELECTROCOMP. ECOM 904690 
ENTERPRISE INNS ETI 137668 
EUROMONEY INSTL.INVESTOR ERM 728803 
EXPERIAN EXPN 410124 
FENNER FENR 900575 
FIDESSA GROUP FDSA 897412 
FILTRONA FLTR 31110U 
FIRST GROUP FGP 135229 
FORTH PORTS FPT 928787 
GALIFORM GFRM 507530 
GAME GROUP GMG 910532 
GENUS GNS 296734 
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GKN GKN 900754 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 900479 
GO-AHEAD GROUP GOG 135565 
GREENE KING GNK 900250 
GREGGS GREG 952780 
HALMA HLMA 910821 
HAYS HAS 901164 
HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS HIK 32273L 
HOMESERVE HSV 928782 
HUNTING HTG 917509 
ICAP IAP 688846 
ICTL.HTLS.GP. IHG 26923V 
IMAGINATION TECHNOLOGIES IMG 135869 
IMI IMI 901704 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GP. IMT 882240 
INCHCAPE INCH 901029 
INFORMA INF 679154 
INMARSAT ISAT 30877H 
INTERNATIONAL POWER IPR 928901 
INTERTEK GROUP ITRK 258092 
INVENSYS ISYS 905110 
ITE GROUP ITE 907765 
JD SPORTS FASHION JD. 882323 
JKX OIL & GAS JKX 139998 
JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 901152 
KAZAKHMYS KAZ 29070U 
KELLER KLR 135540 
KIER GROUP KIE 882977 
KINGFISHER KGF 940281 
LADBROKES LAD 910437 
LAIRD LRD 901107 
LOGICA LOG 901940 
LONMIN LMI 902232 
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP MKS 901207 
MARSTON'S MARS 900274 
MCBRIDE MCB 134982 
MEGGITT MGGT 910509 
MICHAEL PAGE INTL. MPI 255364 
MICRO FOCUS INTL. MCRO 30857U 
MILLENNIUM & CPTH.HTLS. MLC 870866 
MISYS MISY 914192 
52 
 
MITCHELLS & BUTLERS MAB 26923T 
MITIE GROUP MTO 910407 
MORGAN CRUCIBLE MGCR 900408 
MORRISON(WM)SPMKTS. MORW 905576 
MOTHERCARE MTC 905308 
NATIONAL EXPRESS NEX 301917 
NATIONAL GRID NG. 870181 
NEXT NXT 901203 
PACE PIC 875854 
PARTYGAMING PRTY 30234N 
PEARSON PSON 914021 
PENNON GROUP PNN 904391 
PERSIMMON PSN 910133 
PETROFAC PFC 31946M 
PETROPAVLOVSK POG 257965 
PREMIER FARNELL PFL 905498 
PREMIER FOODS PFD 28961T 
PREMIER OIL PMO 900997 
PUNCH TAVERNS PUB 258077 
PZ CUSSONS PZC 910580 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES RRS 897895 
RANK GROUP RNK 900918 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP RB. 900484 
REDROW RDW 507916 
REED ELSEVIER REL 901080 
REGUS RGU 266577 
RENISHAW RSHW 917076 
RENTOKIL INITIAL RENT 906480 
RESTAURANT GROUP RTN 912000 
REXAM REX 901065 
RIO TINTO RIO 901714 
ROBERT WISEMAN DAIRIES RWD 135523 
ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP RR. 940793 
ROTORK RTRK 910649 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL A(LON) RDSA 31347F 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B RDSB 900998 
RPS GROUP RPS 953598 
SABMILLER SAB 695504 
SAGE GROUP SGE 904649 
SAINSBURY (J) SBRY 926002 
SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 928738 
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SDL SDL 278833 
SENIOR SNR 900600 
SERCO GROUP SERC 943663 
SEVERN TRENT SVT 904373 
SHANKS GROUP SKS 981250 
SHIRE SHP 870593 
SIG SHI 946054 
SMITH & NEPHEW SN. 900487 
SMITH (DS) SMDS 910685 
SMITHS GROUP SMIN 900943 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL SIA 897311 
SPECTRIS SXS 953203 
SPIRAX-SARCO SPRX 900741 
SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS SPT 900493 
SSL INTERNATIONAL SSL 914579 
ST.JAMES'S PLACE STJ 882217 
STAGECOACH GROUP SGC 319410 
STHREE STHR 32301X 
SYNERGY HEALTH SYR 14408R 
TATE & LYLE TATE 900819 
TAYLOR WIMPEY TW. 900345 
TESCO TSCO 900803 
TOMKINS TOMK 911258 
TRAVIS PERKINS TPK 931669 
TULLOW OIL TLW 506343 
ULTRA ELECTRONICS HDG. ULE 882275 
UNILEVER (UK) ULVR 900789 
UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA UBM 901106 
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP UU. 904367 
VICTREX VCTA 870364 
VODAFONE GROUP VOD 953133 
VT GROUP VTG 943559 
WEIR GROUP WEIR 900699 
WETHERSPOON (JD) JDW 301861 
WHITBREAD WTB 900271 
WILLIAM HILL WMH 258107 
WOLSELEY WOS 900764 
WOOD GROUP (JOHN) WG. 258098 
WPP WPP 926119 
XSTRATA XTA 15322M 
YELL GROUP YELL 27237R 
 
